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As  the  Doha  Round  of  trade  negotiations  under  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO) 
continue to stagnate, free trade agreements (FTAs) will likely serve as the primary driving 
force to promote liberalization and rulemaking in the area of trade for some time to come. 
Especially, mega FTAs having comprehensive coverage both in terms of economic activities 
and  trade—such  as  the  Trans-Pacific  Partnership  (TPP);  the  economic  partnership 
agreement  (EPA)  between  Japan  and  the    European  Union  (EU);  the  Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP); the trilateral FTA among Japan, China, and 
South Korea; and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the 
United States and the EU—are expected to play an important role in changing the global 
trade system. 
At the same time, however, mega FTAs are by nature geographically closed and meant to 
enhance supply chains within specific geographic regions. Without sufficient progress in 
harmonization, they will not lead to the creation of truly global trade rules. They even pose a 
significant risk of creating a “spaghetti bowl” of conflicting rules. 
Furthermore, as an agreement between or among specific member economies, FTAs are 
predicated  on  the  assumption  that  there  will  be  discrimination  between  members  and 
non-members. FTAs are different from economic blocs in the 1920s in that the former is a 
mechanism to lower barriers between members relative to those to non-members whereas 
the latter is a mechanism to raise barriers to non-members. But they are no different in that 
they are both intended to discriminate between members and non-members in the treatment 
of  trade.  As  such,  mega  FTAs  are  prone  to  give  rise  to  the  problem  of  discrimination 
                                            
1  See VoxEU column (http://www.voxeu.org/article/it-time-international-supply-chain-agreement) for a 
summary (Nakatomi (2013b)) 2 
between those invited and those not. Debate over the adverse effects of trade diversion has 
somewhat subsided recently. However, even if the magnitude of trade diverting effects of 
FTAs is insignificant relative to the size of the global trade, their impact on the competitive 
relationship between countries is significant. 
Also, as shown by two separate studies on trade in value added, one conducted by the 
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) and 
the WTO and the other by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the WTO, global value chains (GVCs) are continuously changing in shape and 
structure, and there is no guarantee that an FTA covering a specific geographic region will 
continue to contribute to the facilitation of value chain development.
  2  3 
 
1.  Four Scenarios 
How should we understand the relationship between the establishment of truly global rules 
and value chains, and mega FTAs? What impact will mega FTAs have on the global trade 
regime or what role will they play over a medium to long term horizon? It is hard to say that 
sufficient discussion has been made regarding this point. 
In  what  follows,  I  would  like  to  outline  three  possible  scenarios  and  propose  a  set  of 
measures to bring them closer toward a more desirable scenario which is Scenario 4. 
Scenario 1: Euphoric Scenario 
Let  me  venture  to  expatiate  on  a  euphoric  scenario  implicitly  assumed  by  mega  FTA 
advocates. Their argument is inferred to be based on the following premises: 
1)  Mega FTAs will be concluded before long 
2)  There will be no or little fragmentation (no or only a modest spaghetti bowl) of rules 
across different FTAs 
3)  Entangling rules can and will be harmonized 
4)  Harmonization will not take much time 
5)  Rules resulting from harmonization will serve as the basis for rulemaking at the WTO 
6)  Differences in rules applicable inside and outside of mega FTAs (members versus 
non-members) will not pose any major problems (or, even if they do, any conflict 
arising from such differences is of secondary importance and can be addressed later) 
These premises point to an ideal scenario: mega FTAs will be concluded soon, fragmented 
                                            
2  IDE-JETRO and WTO (2011) 
3  OECD-WTO (2012), “Trade in Value-Added: Concepts, Methodologies and Challenges” 3 
rules will converge (or “spaghetti bowls” will turn into “lasagna plates”
4) in due time, and a 
new set of de facto global trade rules—particularly for areas not covered by the existing 
rules—will emerge to serve as the basis for future rulemaking at the WTO. However, in 
order for this to be realized, all of the above premises must be correct. 
Scenario 2: WTO 2.0 
Next, let’s take a look at the WTO 2.0 scenario advocated by Professor Richard Baldwin.
5 
Professor  Baldwin  has  been  arguing  that  mega  FTAs  will  create  a  “WTO  2.0,”  a  new 
governing body for 21st century trade rules as compared to the existing WTO which governs 
20th century trade rules. 
His argument seems to be predicated on the assumption that the WTO 2.0 will be organized 
as a separate body because its members and applicable rules differ from those  of the 
existing WTO. He considers the WTO 2.0 separable from the WTO because the former is to 
set rules that address the needs of the 21st century (investment, competition, etc.) in tune 
with the global operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) whereas the latter deals with 
rules for 20th century trade, and contends that the existing WTO is incapable of creating 
21st century rules because of flaws in its decision-making mechanism. Meanwhile, in terms 
of membership, Professor Baldwin focuses on North America, the EU, and Asia as the 
primary members in view of the actual state of supply chain trade, whereby the universality 
of membership is of secondary importance at the best. These are the assumptions based 
upon which he predicts the emergence of a trade system in which the WTO and the WTO 
2.0 co-exist.
6 
Scenario 3: Spaghetti Bowl of Rules (Fragmentation Scenario) 
Obviously, both Scenarios 1 and 2 have been driven by strong dissatisfaction with and a 
growing sense of resignation about the stalemate of the WTO and the Doha Round. And 
there is no doubt that mega FTAs will become a major driving force to promote international 
rulemaking and liberalization. However, taking an excessively optimistic view of mega FTAs 
is  dangerous.  Let’s  examine  each  premise  underlying  Scenario  1  to  see  whether  it  is 
realistic. 
Regarding premise 1), given the level of ambition, complexity, the magnitude of potential 
economic impact, and the sheer number and diversity of countries involved, concluding a 
mega FTA is not an easy task. It is rather natural to expect negotiations to be long and 
                                            
4  IDB and ICTSD (2012), pp. 24-25 
5  Baldwin (2011 and 2012) 
6  Professor Baldwin’s argument is not necessarily an organizational theory and therefore WTO 2.0 can be 
taken as referring to a collection of 21st century rules evolving from mega FTAs. A process for harmonizing 
the existing WTO rules and those of the WTO 2.0 in the future is not necessarily clear. 4 
drawn  out.  Cases  of  mega  FTA  negotiations  in  the  past—such  as  those  for  the  North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—caution against making optimistic assumptions 
about time. Indeed, one misstep could derail or end the entire negotiations. 
As  such,  while  all  participating  countries’  dedicated  efforts  for  an  early  conclusion  are 
absolutely necessary, it is reasonable to assume that the negotiation of mega FTAs will take 
a significant period of time even with the strong will of all of the participants.
7 
Premises 2) and 3) will need to be examined in consideration of the future development of 
mega FTA negotiations. Considering significant differences across countries in regulatory 
frameworks  and  economic  infrastructure,  however,  it  is  only  natural  to  expect  that 
negotiations for mega FTAs, which tend to involve the ironing out of differences in economic 
systems, will be as heavy going and time consuming as those under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO. There is no guarantee that rules and disciplines 
in specific areas will converge across different mega FTAs. In concluding its FTAs with the 
EU and the United States, South Korea had to apply different definitions with respect to 
international  standards  in  the  area  of  automobiles  as  well  as  in  that  of  electronics  and 
electrical products. As such, it seems unavoidable that the emergence of a series of mega 
FTAs—the  TPP,  the  Japan-EU  EPA,  the  TTIP,  and  so  forth—will  result  in  numerous 
conflicting  rules  reflecting  differences  in  regulations  and  regulatory  philosophies  among 
major economies in various areas including intellectual property (e.g., treatment of right 
infringement  on  the  Internet),  information  (e.g.,  relationship  between  the  cross-border 
transfer  of  information  and  privacy),  and  competition  (e.g.,  definition  of  “state-owned 
enterprises” and discipline on their behavior).
8  This is to say that there is no guarantee for 
rules and disciplines to be set in a harmonized manner across mega FTAs. Furthermore, as 
negotiations take place separately for respective mega FTAs, it is naturally expected that 
they  will  produce  different  agreements  and  hence  resulting  in  the  current  presence  of 
different rules and disciplines. 
For the same reason, if such negotiations result in a spaghetti bowl of rules, there is no 
guarantee that differences among mega FTAs will be harmonized in a short period of time 
as  assumed  in  premise  4).  And  if  no  harmonization  takes  place,  premise  5)  fails,  and 
providing a basis for rulemaking at the WTO will not occur. 
As  to  premise  6),  differences  in  rules  applicable  inside  and  outside  of  mega  FTAs  or 
different  treatment  between  members  and  non-members  could  pose  a  major  problem. 
                                            
7  This is not meant to refer to the prospect of any specific mega FTA. 
8  As a hub of mega FTAs and a forerunner in the area of rulemaking, Japan is positioned to prevent a 
tangle of rules, and it can and should play a leading role in doing so. See Nakatomi (2012b). 5 
Supply chains are changing constantly in all aspects—i.e., procurement, production, and 
distribution—and in terms of countries concerned as they adapt to changes in the global 
operations of MNEs. Indeed, the globalization of supply chains is proceeding apace. What is 
truly needed now is not regional trade rules but global trade rules and supply chains. 
The close examination of those premises should reveal that Scenario 1 is fraught with the 
real danger of turning into Scenario 3, which is to give rise to a spaghetti bowl of rules. 
 
2.  Toward the Development of a Harmonized Trade Policy (Scenario 4) 
In order for mega FTAs to be able to become the basis for a truly global system, what 
perspectives are needed? 
As the WTO and the Doha Round continue to stagnate, mega FTAs will no doubt serve as 
the  basis  for  the  formation  of  a  new  international  trade  regime  in  the  years  to  come. 
However, it is dangerous to count too much on mega FTAs to automatically bring in a new 
order for international trade to accommodate the newly arising needs of GVCs. Although 
earnest  efforts  and  dialogue  for  and  under  mega  FTAs  will  be  the  basis  for  global 
rulemaking, it is important to keep in mind the following five perspectives: 
(1)  Clear vision of the future trade system 
First, we need to have a clear vision of the future trade system we intend to build. As in other 
areas,  the  United  States  and  the  EU  tend  to  compete  for  hegemony  in  the  area  of 
international trade. In this regard, Japan’s role is extremely important as it is well-positioned 
to mediate between the two big powers (as a “hub” of international trade policy through the 
TPP and the Japan-EU EPA), and its economic system is generally flexible (though there 
are some difficult areas).
9  The United States and the EU have had many attempts to adjust 
their regulatory differences, but they have not necessarily been successful. Against this 
backdrop, Japan is not a peripheral player but has the casting vote to determine the form 
and nature of the global trade system in the coming years. 
(2)    Global Solution 
Second, it is important to design a global solution, not a regional solution. Indeed, what the 
business community is looking for is not a regional solution by means of FTAs but a global 
solution and GVCs. In this regard, drawing a strategy with an eye set on the future of the 
                                            
9  Japan made a significant contribution to the successful conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA). See Nakatomi (2012b), pp. 37-39. 6 
WTO and future WTO rules is essential. 
It is dangerous to forget and underestimate the role of the WTO. The ongoing state of the 
WTO and the Doha Round is surely problematic. However, it is high time that we should 
start having a full-blown discussion on the reform of the WTO without looking away from the 
reality.
10 
Also,  even  though  the  WTO  and  the  Doha  Round  are  in  a  very  difficult  situation  as 
discussed  above,  its  function  as  a  judiciary  body  and  the  day-to-day  monitoring  and 
administrative functions of its various committees are working properly and effectively. In 
addition to supporting and utilizing the judicial function of WTO panels, we must support 
various committee activities and soft law making at the WTO, which are extremely important 
in order to support and maintain the global trade system. 
(3)  Transparency, disclosure, and information sharing 
Third, ensuring transparency, disclosure, and information sharing is also critically important. 
The effective halting of the WTO’s function to assess the consistency of FTAs has given 
leeway for some FTAs—mega FTAs in particular—to introduce provisions overriding those 
of  the  relevant  WTO  agreements.  As  such,  there  is  a  compelling  need  to  promote  the 
multilateralization  of  FTAs  and  the  localization  of  WTO  rules.  Transparency  and  the 
distribution of accurate information are what constitute the foundation of this endeavor. In 
order to avoid a spaghetti bowl of rules and prevent the polarization of trade systems as a 
result of mega FTAs, it is essential to establish appropriate procedural rules and ensure 
transparency in their application (e.g., public comment procedure) within FTAs as well as to 
ensure transparency in the eyes of those outside of FTAs. This would directly contribute to 
the establishment of GVCs. 
(4)  Concept of GVCs 
Fourth, the concept of GVCs and the viewpoint of the business community must be fully 
taken  into  consideration.  The  necessity  of  GVCs  is  now  becoming  a  common  view  of 
business communities across the world. The WTO is often criticized for its inability to listen 
to  the  voices  of  the  business  community  and  the  same  holds  true  for  mega  FTAs.  If 
participating countries are drawn into a power struggle for hegemony and forget about the 
needs of the business community, they would repeat the same mistake made by the WTO. 
The business community has been too indifferent to developments at the WTO, while the 
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WTO has been too insensible to the needs of the business community and the reality of the 
global  economy. This is exemplified by a lack of communication between the business 
community and the WTO. In the case of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an 
advisory body called the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) has been serving as a 
channel for listening to and reflecting the voices of the business community, while the OECD 
has the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC). Both the ABAC and the BIAC 
have been actively providing inputs to policymakers under their respective frameworks. The 
WTO,  however,  has  no  such  advisory  body  representing  the  voices  of  the  business 
community. 
Too much emphasis on the nature of the WTO as a government-to-government forum has 
resulted in the current stalemate, i.e., inability to deliver tangible results over a long period of 
time due to inter-governmental conflicts and rivalry, causing the business community to lose 
interest in the WTO and intensifying the global race for FTAs. Members of the business 
community should make inputs to the WTO in a more straightforward manner, and the WTO 
should listen to their voices. Otherwise the WTO would be forced into irrelevancy and its 
existence put at stake. 
(5)  Issue-based global rulemaking 
Fifth, we should embrace the concept of issue-based international rulemaking.
11  12  Mega 
FTAs must not be seen as something opposed to the WTO. Instead, we should promote the 
results of mega FTAs as a foundation for future WTO rules on an issue-by-issue basis and 
better utilize issue-based plurilateral agreements. 
In a set of proposals put forward on April 2013, Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) 
underlined the need to set a “unified axis” for Japan’s trade strategy.
13  Indeed, it is very 
important for Japan to define its unified axis on a sector-by-sector and issue-by-issue basis 
and take a coherent approach in negotiating various mega FTAs.   
It would be extremely difficult to solve a spaghetti bowl of rules after concluding mega FTAs. 
In  order  to  avoid  this,  major  players—including  the  United  States  and  the  EU—should 
promote plurilateral initiatives on a sector-by-sector and issue-by-issue basis. 
Last year, I proposed an International Supply Chain Agreement (ISCA), to be detailed in the 
                                            
11  See Nakatomi (2012b) 
12  See Nakatomi (2013a) 
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 8 
following section, as a vehicle to facilitate global supply chains. In view of the ongoing 
developments in mega FTA negotiations and the need to avoid the fragmentation of rules 
and provide a basis for future rulemaking at the WTO, it is extremely important for the 
governments  of  major  economies  to  pursue  plurilateral  agreements  in  priority  areas  as 
defined in collaboration with the business community. 
 
3.  What is the ISCA? 
The  ISCA  is  a  concept  of  a  comprehensive  plurilateral  agreement  on  GVCs,  which  I 
proposed at the E15 Expert Group Meeting on Global Value Chains in Geneva in November 
2012, co-organized by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). As someone who was closely 
involved  in  and  contributed  to  the  successful  conclusion  of  the  Information  Technology 
Agreement  (ITA)  and  the  Anti-Counterfeiting  Trade  Agreement  (ACTA),  I  have  been 
focusing on the potential of plurilateral agreements as a tool to complement the WTO. In 
particular, I have pointed out that we can negotiate not just a single issue but multiple issues 
in  a  bundle  by  designing  plurilateral  agreements  strategically.
14  Considering  successful 
examples in the past as well as the increasing interest in and support for GVCs within the 
business  community,  it  is  necessary  and  quite  possible  to  discuss  and  negotiate  rules 
governing GVCs as a plurilateral agreement.   
Readers are advised to refer to the proposal
15  for details, but I would like to provide a 
general overview and idea of the concept. 
(1)  Outline of the ISCA 
i) Basic principles 
In proposing the ISCA concept, I defined some basic principles which, inter alia, include: 
1)  Creating rules that are consistent with and complementary to the existing WTO rules 
and provide the basis for future WTO rules; 
2)  Not undermining the Doha Round; 
3)  Extending resulting benefits to non-participants on a most favored nation (MFN) basis 
in general; 
4)  Contributing to the elimination of the spaghetti bowl phenomenon in the rules of origin 
and other rules 
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5)  Aiming to achieve an early conclusion; and 
6)  Cooperating and consulting closely with the business community. 
Among those, 1) and 4) are the two sides of the same coin. However, as the goal of GVCs is 
to create an efficient global business environment, simply contributing to the facilitation of 
value chains within a specific geographic region is not enough and allowing for the presence 
of multiple conflicting rules is inappropriate. Although mega FTAs contribute to value chain 
enhancement, they are not meant to provide a global solution. Limited in geographic scope 
and intended to set regional rules, mega FTAs per se cannot substitute the WTO that has 
members from all over the world and globally applicable rules. 
Although it may seem that 2) is something we can take for granted, such is not the case in 
fact. If certain issues subject to the ongoing Doha Round are taken out and agreed upon 
under a plurilateral framework, it could halt the Doha Round negotiations in the relevant 
areas. Therefore, it is appropriate to exclude the issues covered by the Doha Round from 
the scope of plurilateral negotiations. As a consequence of the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in 2011, consensus is being built among WTO members on the possibility of unbundling 
issues  and  negotiating  different  issues  at  different  paces  (e.g.,  ITA,  trade  facilitation). 
However, discussing issues on the Doha agenda—i.e., those being negotiated within the 
WTO—elsewhere outside the WTO would create great confusion. 
Being a plurilateral agreement, the ISCA should naturally seek to secure the participation of 
major  economies  that  would  constitute  a  critical  mass,  but  there  are  pros  and  cons 
regarding 3), i.e., the MFN extension of benefits resulting from the agreement. This is the 
question of whether or not to allow free-riding by non-participants, and opinions are sharply 
divided among WTO members. However, successful plurilateral agreements—the ITA, the 
Basic  Telecommunications  Services  Agreement,  and  the  Financial  Services 
Agreement—extend their benefits to non-participants on an MFN basis, and following those 
examples will definitely increase the chance for successful conclusion. Conversely, it would 
be extremely difficult to justify any plurilateral agreement under the framework of the WTO, if 
not premised on the principle of MFN extension. 
In order to design a global system with an eye on multilateral rules in the future against the 
backdrop of increasing attempts to pursue a non-MFN approach through mega FTAs, we 
need to have a concept of global common rules. This is closely related to 4), as simply piling 
partial solutions achieved through mega FTAs is a promising recipe for a spaghetti bowl of 
rules. Even if the tangle of conflicting rules resulting from mega FTAs can be disentangled 
afterward, it would be a long and difficult way to achieve that end. 10 
Given the ongoing “failure” of the Doha Round, 5) is a natural requisite. Speed is one of the 
major  factors  explaining  many  countries’  preference  for  FTAs  over  the  Doha  Round. 
Negotiations for the ISCA must proceed with a sense of speed and without undue delay, 
and, in order to enable this, it would be necessary to adjust or compromise on the agenda 
and the level of ambition. This is because I find it necessary to conclude the ISCA before too 
much harm is done by the multipolar system that would result from mega FTAs. Speed is 
also of high priority for the business community where companies operate in dog years. 
What all of this tells us is that countries and economies joining the ISCA must not indulge 
themselves in a hegemonic war. Instead, it may be necessary to set a clear timeframe for 
negotiations, for instance, to achieve a conclusion within three years, and limit the scope of 
negotiation to priority areas so as to ensure its conclusion within that period of time. Also, 
participants should focus their efforts on institutional and regulatory harmonization, not on 
sprawling negotiations that may never reach conclusion. Harmonization, by its own virtue, 
means a lot to the international trade regime and GVCs. (Please recall the case of the 
ACTA.) 
Promoting close cooperation and consultation with the business community, as stated in 6), 
is extremely important as we need to have a clear idea as to why and for whose benefit we 
should  negotiate.  One  big  problem  with  the  WTO  is  the  distance  with  the  business 
community. Placing so much emphasis on its role as an intergovernmental coordinator, the 
WTO has become a political battle field for member economies, looking away from the 
reality of the global economy and business activities. This resulted in the ongoing crisis of 
the WTO and the Doha Round. 
ii) Areas to be covered by the ISCA 
What specific areas should be covered by the ISCA? First and foremost, it is necessary to 
coordinate  views  with  the  business  community  as  discussed  above.  After  that,  it  is 
necessary  to  narrow  down  the  focus  so  as  not  to  create  too  heavy  an  agenda.
16  For 
example, potential areas for negotiation include the following: 
To  begin  with,  including  those  areas  currently  negotiated  in  the  Doha  Round  is  both 
detrimental and counterproductive. Given that, two types of behind-the-border measures 
that are of strong interest to the business community and not covered the Doha Round—i.e., 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures—can be 
highlighted  as  potential  areas  for  ISCA  negotiation,  whereas  trade  facilitation  can  be  a 
candidate only if the Doha Round fails on this issue. Export restrictions can be cited as 
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another important candidate. 
Among the areas not covered by the existing WTO agreements, the issue of trade and 
investment and that of trade and competition—both of which had been initially on the Doha 
agenda as “Singapore Issues”—can be cited as candidates along with electronic commerce 
and preferential origin rules. 
In reality, it is no easy task to press forward with the ISCA initiative in the midst of a stream 
toward mega FTAs. Obviously, mega FTAs are of primary concern for major economies. 
And it is certain that mega FTAs will be a major driving force for international trade policies 
in the future. Furthermore, attempting to negotiate the ISCA by covering all of the potential 
areas cited above is tantamount to initiating a mini round, and we would end up wrecking the 
initiative. Thus, a realistic approach is for the government and the business community to 
cooperate closely, select truly important areas (such as investment and competition), and 
proceed with the ISCA initiative by concentrating on such areas. What is required today is to 
take it as a premise that mega FTAs will be playing a leading role in the coming years, 
anticipate problems and risks that may arise from mega FTAs, and seek to create future 
multilateral rules based on such premise and anticipation.
17 
(2)  WEF Enabling Trade Report and a World Bank blog 
The World Bank has since taken interest in the ISCA. A World Bank blog coauthored by 
Bernard Hoeckman and Selina Jackson in January 2013 introduced the ISCA as a holistic 
approach to addressing GVC barriers.
18  The initiative was also introduced in the World 
Economic Forum’s Enabling Trade report in 2013 as well as in the Swedish National Board 
of Trade’s report on GVCs and the U.S.-EU FTA.
19  20 
The  ISCA  proposal  is  meant  to  present  a  path  toward  finding  a  concrete  solution  to 
problems surrounding GVCs. The underlying idea is that the governments and business 
communities of concerned countries from around the world should work together to find, 
communicate, and realize global solutions on an issue-by-issue basis. This initiative is a 
realistic approach, and, if those governments and business communities work in earnest to 
address GVCs barriers, it will definitely deliver tangible results just like the ITA and the 
ACTA. Relying solely on mega FTAs is dangerous not only for Japan but for the world. It is 
strongly hoped that the global community will navigate the stormy sea of mega FTAs with 
viable strategic options such as the ISCA in hand. 
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Specific issues or areas to be covered by the ISCA can be determined flexibly through 
consultation  between  governments  and  business  communities.  Needless  to  say,  the 
selection of issues must be a realistic one. Carrying out this task in this era of mega FTAs is 
surely difficult, but this may be one of those cases where the longest way around turns out 
to be the nearest way home. I hope that vigorous discussion will be made on the ISCA as a 
new, government-business collaborative approach. 
It should be noted that issue-based coordination is meaningful even when it falls short of a 
formal  agreement.  Japan,  the  United  States,  the  EU,  and  Canada  used  to  form  the 
Quadrilateral group, or the Quad, to make close coordination on important trade issues. 
Although this particular mechanism no longer exists today, such an informal framework for 
coordination among major players in international trade can play a crucial role in the era of 
mega FTAs. It is high time to explore some sort of coordination framework. 
The  five  perspectives  discussed  in  Section  2  (Scenario  4)  are  for  illustrative  purposes. 
Meanwhile, in order to steer mega FTAs in a way to contribute to the formation of a more 
harmonious  trade  regime,  international  collaboration  of  governments  and  business 
communities is indispensable. 
Today, GVCs are subject to an increasingly vigorous debate, which has been driven by 
diverse concerns and interests. Indeed, against the backdrop of the rise of mega FTAs and 
the continuing stagnation of the WTO Doha Round, GVCs offer an effective viewpoint and a 
fresh dimension from which to explore the new frontier of international trade policies and 
global  governance.  Governments  and  business  communities  from  all  around  the  world 
should  actively  cooperate  and  work  together  toward  the  facilitation  of  GVCs  and  the 
realization of global governance of trade policies. I hope that this paper, the proposal of the 
ISCA in particular, could be of help toward achieving that end.   13 
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